PART II - GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Automatism
9. (1) A person who acts in a state of unconsciousness, or whose consciousness is so impaired as to make him or her unable to control his or her actions, shall not be liable for any offence committed during such a state.
2) This defence shall not be available to any person who, knowing
of the existence of the condition which gives rise to such conduct, nonetheless recklessly places himself or herself in circumstances where she or he is likely to cause harm to persons or property.
PART II - GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Negligence or recklessness
10. A person who causes harm to the person or property of another or exposes others to a risk of injury or death through negligence or recklessness commits an offence.
PART II - GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Culpability
11. (2) A person intends to perform an act if he or she purposefully directs his or her will towards the performance of that act. A person intends the consequences of his or her act if-
(a) he or she acts knowing that the consequences will occur as a result of his or her action; or
(b) he or she acts while foreseeing that there is a real possibility of that consequence occurring and he or she is reckless as to whether or not the consequence occurs.
PART II - GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Culpability
11. (3) Where it is a requirement of an offence that the accused should have known of the existence of a particular circumstance, then awareness on the part of the accused of the possibility of the existence of that circumstance, together with recklessness as to whether it existed, shall satisfy the requirement of knowledge in that case.
PART II - GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Culpability
11. (4) A person is reckless in relation to a possible consequence if he
or she knows that there is a substantial possibility that the consequence will occur and acts nonetheless, being indifferent as to whether or not the consequence occurs.
1. The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this Statute.
2. A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be individually responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with this Statute.
3. In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person:
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible;
(b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted;
(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission;
(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either:
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime;
(e) In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to commit genocide;
(f) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur because of circumstances independent of the person's intentions. However, a person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevents the completion of the crime shall not be liable for punishment under this Statute for the attempt to commit that crime if that person completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose.
3 bis. In respect of the crime of aggression, the provisions of this article shall apply only to persons in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State.
4. No provision in this Statute relating to individual criminal responsibility shall affect the responsibility of States under international law.