Article 46. Necessary defense
1. An action for which this Code provides for liability, but committed in a state of necessary defense, that is, for the purpose of protecting the person, property of a person, home and other objects owned or otherwise held by him, as well as other rights of the defender or another person, the interests of society and the state protected by law from a socially dangerous attack, is not a crime if this attack was associated with violence dangerous to the life and health of the defender or another person, or with an immediate threat of using such violence.
2. Defense against an attack not involving violence that is dangerous to the life and health of the defender or another person, or with an immediate threat of using such violence, as well as defense against an attack on someone else’s property, are lawful if the limits of necessary defense have not been exceeded, that is, deliberate actions that do not correspond to the nature and danger of the attack.
3. Exceeding the limits of necessary defense is recognized as the discrepancy between the defense and the nature and degree of public danger of the attack, as a result of which the attacker suffers excessive, serious harm not caused by the situation.
4. The actions of a defending person shall not be considered an excess of the limits of necessary defense if this person, due to the unexpectedness of the attack, could not objectively assess the degree and nature of the danger of the attack. Causing bodily harm to the attacker, including causing his death due to an unexpected attack or due to negligence, shall not entail criminal liability.
5. The actions of a defending person when defending against the illegal and violent entry of an intruder into a home, committed against the will of a person living (staying) there on legal grounds, causing bodily harm to the attacker, including causing his death, shall not be considered an excess of the limits of necessary defense.
6. Regardless of the severity of the harm caused to the attacker, the use of weapons or any other means or tools for:
1) protection from attack by an armed person;
2) protection from group attacks.
A group attack in this article is considered to be an attack by two or more persons, with the exception of attacks by pregnant women or children under the age of fourteen.
7. The provisions of this article shall apply equally to all persons, regardless of their professional or other special training and official position, and also regardless of the possibility of avoiding a socially dangerous attack or seeking assistance from other persons or authorities.
Article 47. Extreme necessity
1. It is not a crime for a person to cause harm to protected interests in a state of extreme necessity, that is, to eliminate a danger threatening the person and rights of the given person or other persons, the interests of society, the state or humanity, if this danger, under the given circumstances, could not be eliminated by other means.
2. A state of extreme necessity is also recognized in the event that actions taken with the aim of preventing danger did not achieve their goal and harm occurred despite the efforts of the person who in good faith hoped to prevent it.
3. Exceeding the limits of extreme necessity is recognized as intentional causing of harm that does not correspond to the nature and degree of the threatening danger and the circumstances under which the danger was eliminated, when harm was caused to the protected interests. Causing harm through negligence does not entail criminal liability.
4. A person shall not be subject to criminal liability for exceeding the limits of extreme necessity if, as a result of strong mental agitation caused by a threatening danger, he could not assess the proportionality of the harm caused to this danger.
1. In addition to other grounds for excluding criminal responsibility provided for in this Statute, a person shall not be criminally responsible if, at the time of that person's conduct:
(c) The person acts reasonably to defend himself or herself or another person or, in the case of war crimes, property which is essential for the survival of the person or another person or property which is essential for accomplishing a military mission, against an imminent and unlawful use of force in a manner proportionate to the degree of danger to the person or the other person or property protected. The fact that the person was involved in a defensive operation conducted by forces shall not in itself constitute a ground for excluding criminal responsibility under this subparagraph;