14. (2) If an event is caused by the acts of several persons acting either jointly or independently, each of those persons who has intentionally or negligently contributed to cause the event shall, subject to the provisions of subsection (3) of this section, and to the provisions of Title v. of this Code with respect to abetment, be deemed to have caused the event; but any matter of exemption, justification, extenuation or aggravation which exists in the case of any one of those persons shall have effect in his case, whether it exists or not in the case of any of the other persons.
14. (3) A person shall not be convicted of having intentionally or negligently caused an event if, notwith- standing his act and the acts of any person acting jointly with him, the event would not have happened but for the existence of some state of facts or the intervention of some other event or of some other person, the probability of the existence or intervention of which other event or person the accused person did not take into consideration, and had no reason to take into consideration. This provision shall not apply where a person is charged with having caused an event by an omission to perform a duty for averting the event.
14. (4) If a person beyond the jurisdiction of the courts causes an involuntary agent to cause an event within the jurisdiction, he shall be deemed to have caused the event within the jurisdiction.
14. (6) A person shall not, by reason of anything in this section, be relieved from any liability in respect of an attempt to cause an event; and a person shall not, by reason of anything in this section, be relieved from any liability in respect of negligent conduct, if such negligent conduct is punishable under this Code irrespectively of whether it actually causes any event.
84. Where the complete commission of the offence charged is not proved, but the evidence establishes an attempt to commit the offence, the accused may be convicted of this attempt, and punished accordingly:
Provided that after a conviction for the attempt, the person so convicted shall not be liable to be tried again for the offence which he was charged with committing.
85. Where an attempt to commit an offence is charged but the evidence establishes the commission of the full offence, the accused shall not be entitled to be discharged, but he may be convicted of the attempt, and punished accordingly:
Provided that after a conviction for the attempt, the accused shall not be liable to be tried again for the offence which he was charged with attempting to commit.
86. (1) Whoever directly or indirectly, instigates, commands, counsels, procures, organises, directs, solicits or in any manner purposely aids, facilitates, encourages or promotes, whether by his act or presence or otherwise, and every person who does any act for the purpose of aiding, facilitating, encouraging or promoting the commission of an offence by any other person, whether known or unknown, certain or uncertain, is guilty of abetting that offence, and of abetting the other person in respect of that offence.
86. (2) Whoever abets a crime or offence shall, if the same is actually committed in pursuance or during the continuance of the abetment, be deemed guilty of that crime or offence.
87. (1) Where a person abets a particular offence, or abets an offence against or in respect of a particular person or thing, and the person abetted actually commits a different offence, or commits the offence against or in respect of a different person or thing, or in a manner different from that which was intended by the abettor, the following provisions shall have effect, that is to say —
(a) if it appears that the offence actually committed was not a probable consequence of the endea- vour to commit, nor was substantially the same as the offence which the abettor intended to abet, nor was within the scope of the abetment, the abettor shall be punishable for his abetment of the offence which he intended to abet in the manner provided by this Title with respect to the abetment of offences which are not actually committed;
(b) in any other case, the abettor shall be deemed to have abetted the offence which was actually committed, and shall be liable to punishment accordingly.
(2) If a person abets a riot or unlawful assembly, with the knowledge that unlawful violence is intended or is likely to be used, he is guilty of abetting violence of any kind or degree which is committed by any other person in executing the purposes of the riot or assembly, although he did not expressly intend to abet violence of that kind or degree.
1. The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this Statute.
2. A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be individually responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with this Statute.
3. In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person:
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible;
(b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted;
(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission;
(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either:
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime;
(e) In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to commit genocide;
(f) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur because of circumstances independent of the person's intentions. However, a person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevents the completion of the crime shall not be liable for punishment under this Statute for the attempt to commit that crime if that person completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose.
3 bis. In respect of the crime of aggression, the provisions of this article shall apply only to persons in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State.
4. No provision in this Statute relating to individual criminal responsibility shall affect the responsibility of States under international law.